We consider a two-period portfolio problem with predictable assets returns. First-order (secondorder) predictability means that an increase in the first period returns yields a first-order (secondorder) stochastically dominated shift in the distribution of the second period state prices. Mean reversion in stock returns, Bayesian learning, stochastic volatility and stochastic interest rates (bond portfolios) belong to one of these two types of predictability. We first show that a first-order stochastically dominated shift in the state price density reduces the marginal value of wealth if and only if relative risk aversion is uniformly larger than unity. This implies that first-order predictability generates a positive hedging demand for portfolio risk if this condition is met. A similar result is obtained with second-order predictability under the condition that absolute prudence be uniformly smaller than twice the absolute risk aversion. When relative risk aversion is constant, these two conditions are equivalent. We also examine the effect of exogenous predictability, i.e., when the information about the future opportunity set is conveyed by signals not contained in past asset prices.
1 Introduction Merton (1969 Merton ( ,1971 has shown that there is a hedging demand for assets when the future investment opportunity set is correlated with past asset returns, i.e. when asset returns are predictable. Several authors, considering various information structures about the stochastic opportunity set, characterized optimal dynamic portfolio management. Pursuing operational goals, they seldom tried to provide an intuition to their results. It is usually mentioned that a change in the opportunity set has a substitution e ect and a wealth e ect which makes the global e ect ambiguous. Besides the fact that this argument is not really explicit, it fails to explain why the sign of the hedging demand depends upon whether relative risk aversion, assuming it to be constant, be smaller or larger than unity. Systematically, the intuitively appealing sign of the hedging demand is obtained when constant relative risk aversion is larger than unity.We believe that operational rules can be helpful only if one can explain their intuition to the decision makers. How could we explain to an investor with a constant relative risk aversion less than unity that mean-reversion in stock returns would cause him to reduce, rather than to increase, his demand for stocks? Why is the unity of relative risk aversion critical for the sign of the hedging demand? Why can it be counter-intuitive? Why are we unable to determine the sign of the hedging demand for some specific forms of information structure? The main aim of this paper is to answer these questions.
We will provide a typology of the various concepts of predictability of asset prices. For each type of predictability, we will explain the underlying mechanisms a ecting the optimal dynamic portfolio management. By doing so, we will not limit the analysis to preferences exhibiting constant relative (or absolute) risk aversion. It is useful not to rely on such conditions in order to be able to disentangle the various e ects of the predictability of returns. We consider the simplest dynamic structure to examine the e ect of predictability by using a three-date two-period economy. Our objective is to provide a structure and some intuition to this wide literature, rather than to improve the existing operational rules.
One of the earliest practical examples of predictability in future returns is shown by Detemple (1986) and Gennotte (1986) . In their model, investors do not know the size of the equity premium, but learn about it over time by observing stock returns. We can present the following simple parable to illustrate the problem: in a casino, there is an urn of indistinguishable coins, half of which are "good" and half "bad". The good and bad coins land heads with di erent probabilities that are known a priori. A single coin is picked at random from the urn that is used for n plays of the game. At each play of the game, you choose how much you want to bet. Because the same coin is tossed in the n plays, the first outcomes convey information about the distribution of future payo s. In this specific example, a good (bad) draw in the first round is good (bad) news for the future opportunity set. Investors can hedge against the risk on the future opportunity set by reducing their initial stake.
The question is whether they should do so. More generally, would one adopt a di erent risk exposure in play 1 of the game if di erent coins were used for the various plays?
1 Assuming constant relative risk aversion, Gennotte (1986) showed that players should hedge the risk by reducing their initial risk exposure if and only if relative risk aversion is larger than unity. Brennan (1998) and Barberis (2000) estimate the e ect of learning on the optimal dynamic portfolio strategy.
Predictability can also come from the existence of serial correlation in stock returns. The predictability of stock and bond returns has recently been recognized. Barberis (2000) for example estimates significant predictability of US stocks returns. The implied standard deviation of ten-year returns is 23.7 percent, much smaller than the 45.2 percent value implied by the standard deviation of monthly returns.
2 More precisely, there is mean-reversion in stock returns: a high return of the risky portfolio in period t implies a lower expected portfolio return in period t + 1: good news today means bad news for the future opportunity set. Because mean-reversion implies that stocks are safer in the long run, the intuition suggests that a long horizon agent should have a positive hedging demand for risk in the initial stage of the game. Kim and Omberg (1996) and Kogan and Uppal (2000) showed that this is indeed the case if constant relative risk aversion is larger than unity. Campbell and Viceira (1999) and Barberis (2000) numerically estimated this hedging demand. The hedging demand for stocks is surprisingly large. For an agent with a relative risk aversion equaling 10 and a ten-year time 1 McCardle and Winkler (1992) asked this question to over 200 students and most people answered that they prefer not to bet at first, in order to gather information about the coin.
2 See also Poterba and Summers (1988) , Campbell (1996) , Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) and Cochrane (2001) .
horizon, the optimal investment in stocks is about 40% of current wealth without predictability. It goes up to 100% when mean-reversion is taken into account. Cochrane (2001) argues that this makes the equity premium puzzle even worse. This also shows that the time horizon of the investor is an important element to take into account in order to determine the optimal portfolio: when relative risk aversion is constant and larger than unity, a longer time horizon should induce investors to take more risk. The contrary is true if constant relative risk aversion is less than unity.
Predictability also arises from random time-varying volatility of stock returns. There is ample evidence that large negative returns tend to be associated with increases in volatility over long periods of time (French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) , Ghysels, Harvey and Renault (1996) , Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) ). Chacko and Viceira (2000) show that when changes in volatility are negatively correlated to excess stock returns, there is a negative (resp. positive) hedging demand when constant relative risk aversion is larger (resp. smaller) than unity. They also show that this generates a sizable hedging demand only when low frequency shocks to volatility exhibit enough persistence.
A fourth example of predictability is provided by the analysis of bond portfolios. Suppose that there is a short bond and a long bond, and that there is uncertainty about the future risk free rate. In such a situation, good news in the second period (high risk free rate) is compatible only with bad news in the first period (low return of the long bond) because of the negative relationship between the interest rate and the price of the longterm bond. Again, because of the negative correlation between the current and the future return of long-term bonds, the intuition is that investors should hedge the future risk by raising their demand for the long-term bond. Brennan, Schwartz and Lagnado (1997) numerically solve a simple version of this model to motivate their paper. They show that the intuition is correct only if the constant relative risk aversion is larger than unity. Campbell and Viceira (2001) calibrated a more complex version of this model to quantify the optimal mix of short-term and long-term bonds.
Our contribution to this literature has two main components. First, we propose a typology of the stochastic nature of the opportunity set. We show that its e ect on optimal portfolios is in fact significantly di erent depending upon the type of predictability faced by investors. In spite of their apparent unity, the above-mentioned results which rely on whether relative risk aversion is larger or smaller than unity hide a diversity of underlying phenomena. Following Lehmann (1966) , we define two types of predictability, namely First-order Stochastic Dominance (FSD) predictability, and MeanPreserving-Spread (MPS) predictability. The predictability of long-term bonds is in the class of FSD predictability. Predictability resulting from either mean-reversion of stock returns, stochastic volatility of these returns, or learning about the size of the equity premium belongs to the class of MPS predictability. It is important to recognize this typology because, contrary to what is suggested in the above-mentioned literature, the necessary and sufficient conditions for an unambiguous e ect of predictability have di erent natures depending upon the class to which they belong.
Our second contribution comes from extending the existing results that are limited to CRRA preferences to any increasing and concave utility function. This is not done for the beauty of the theoretical exercise. Rather, we show that allowing more flexible functional forms is very helpful to extract intuition. In particular, we show how to disentangle the three possible effects of predictability: substitution e ects, wealth e ects and precautionary e ects. These e ects are not apparent with CRRA preferences because of their very specific properties.
3
Most of the existing models in this literature are in continuous-time and are dynamically complete in spite of the fact that investment opportunities are limited to two assets, one being risk free. In this paper, we will consider a much simpler model with only two periods. We maintain the assumption that markets are complete, but this requires the extension of the number of assets to the arbitrarily large number of states in each of the two periods. At the beginning of each period, the investor can rebalance his/her portfolio by purchasing Arrow-Debreu securities whose second-period prices depend upon the realization of the first period state. This is the predictability assumption. There is FSD predictability when the second-period price kernels can be ordered according to first-order stochastic dominance. A FSD-dominated shift in the price kernel is good news for the investor. There is MPS predictability when these price kernels can be compared by using the Rothschild-Stiglitz notion of an increase in risk. A mean-preserving spread in the price kernel is also good news for the investor, since this yields new investment opportuni-ties.
The choice of the initial portfolio risk is driven by the marginal value of wealth at the end of the initial period. This marginal value of wealth depends upon the future opportunity set. If predictability reduces the marginal value of wealth in states where it is large, and if it raises it in states where it is small, predictability has intuitively the same e ect as a reduction in risk aversion. It must then raise the optimal portfolio risk. Consequently, we see that the central step of the analysis is to determine the e ect of an improvement in the opportunity set on the marginal value of wealth. We have seen that this change in the opportunity set takes the form of a FSD or MPS shift in the distribution of the state contingent prices. We show that the mechanisms relating the shift in the distribution of prices and the marginal value of wealth are significantly di erent depending upon whether we examine MPS shifts or FSD shifts. Their respective intuitions are very di erent.
In the case of an FSD-dominated shift in the distribution of state returns, there is a pure substitution e ect and a wealth e ect. Because wealth yields smaller returns in all states, its marginal value is smaller (substitution e ect). But the shift also reduces the final consumption in each state. This raises the marginal utility of consumption and thereby it raises the marginal value of wealth (wealth e ect). The strength of this wealth e ect is proportional to the degree of concavity of the utility function. The net e ect on the marginal value of wealth is negative only if relative risk aversion is su ciently large. This happens to be the case if it is uniformly larger than unity. This result is more general than the existing litterature since it does not rely on any functional form of the utility function.
In the case of an MPS shift, there is a di erent wealth e ect, and a precautionary saving e ect. The MPS provides more risk taking opportunities and therefore raises the expected final consumption. Otherwise these additional risks would not be taken. This reduces the marginal value of wealth. The strength of this wealth e ect increases with absolute risk aversion. But if the marginal utility of consumption is convex (prudence), the increased risk taking also raises the marginal value of wealth. This precautionary saving e ect is increasing in the degree of absolute prudence. Thus an MPS shift in the distribution of state prices reduces the marginal value of wealth only if the ratio of absolute risk aversion to absolute prudence is su ciently large. The critical level of this ratio happens to be 2.
An interesting point is that in the case of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), these two conditions are equivalent: under CRRA, the ratio of absolute risk aversion to absolute prudence is larger than 2 if and only if relative risk aversion is larger than unity! This is why the existing literature did not need to establish a typology of the predictability of returns in the various models. The conditions for an unambiguous e ect of predictability are the same for MPS predictability and FSD predictability when relative risk aversion is constant. This is not the case for other preferences, as when absolute risk aversion is constant (CARA). For CARA preferences, MPS predictability yields an unambiguous hedging demand, but FSD predictability is ambiguous.
In section 2, we consider the classical static Arrow-Debreu portfolio choice model. We characterize the condition on the utility function of the investor which yields an unambiguous e ect on the marginal value of wealth for either a first-order or a second-order stochastically dominated shift in the distribution of state prices. In the remainder of the paper, we use these results in a simple dynamic model of portfolio choice. Section 3 is devoted to FSD predictability, whereas section 4 focuses on MPS predictability. We relate these results to the existing literature in section 5.
Up to now, we assumed that the future opportunity set was perfectly correlated with the first-period return, which implies that markets are complete. However, the assumption of perfect correlation is not empirically plausible. In section 6, we examine the e ect of this market incompleteness on the hedging demand. More precisely, we examine the case where the information about the future opportunity set is conveyed by signals that are not contained in past returns. We say in this case that we have exogenous predictability. To illustrate this, Fama and French (1988) showed that past dividend yields on common stocks is a good predictor of future asset returns. We can infer from the existing literature that investors with constant relative risk aversion should be myopic to exogenous predictability. We examine the e ect of exogenous predictability for other preference functionals.
2 E ect of a change in the opportunity set on the marginal value of wealth 2.1 Description of the problem A first step in the understanding of the e ect of predictability on the optimal dynamic portfolio strategy is obtained by examining the impact of a deterministic change of the opportunity set on the marginal value of wealth. Ex-ante, when the shift in the opportunity set is uncertain, this will tell us where an increase in future wealth is more desirable. If current asset returns are correlated with the shift in the future opportunity set, this information will be useful in determining how to modify the asset portfolio in order to hedge that specific risk. This section is thus devoted to the analysis of a static portfolio problem. We examine the impact of a change in the investment opportunity set on the marginal value of wealth. An immediate application of this analysis concerns the e ect of a change in the investment opportunity set on the optimal initial saving. If this change raised the marginal value of wealth, the optimal saving would be positively a ected by it.
Investors have an initial wealth z at the beginning of the period under scrutiny. There is some uncertainty about the circumstances that will prevail at the end of the period. Let S denote the set of all possible states. We assume that markets are complete. To each state s S, there is an ArrowDebreu security which yields one unit of the consumption good at the end of the period if and only if state s occurs. At the beginning of the period, the price of this security is equal to (s) per unit of probability. Function is often referred to as the pricing kernel. By the mutuality principle, 4 it is well-known that if there are two states with the same state price per unit of probability, it is optimal ex ante to choose the same consumption level in the two states. Without loss of generality, we can thus use the state price per unit of probability as an index for the state. The utility function u of the price-taking investor is assumed to be twice di erentiable, increasing and concave. He/she selects the portfolio that maximizes the expected utility of his/her final consumption:
(1)
The value of wealth z is represented by v(z). We examine the impact of a change in the opportunity set characterized by the vector of the random asset returns on v/ z. The first-order condition of program (1) is written as
Using the envelope theorem, we also obtain that the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint is equal to the marginal value of wealth: = v 0 (z). We know that v inherits from u the property of monotonicity and concavity.
From formulation (1), we observe that the only thing that matters in determining the (marginal) value of wealth is the distribution of the state prices per unit of probability. Under complete markets, a change in the investment opportunity set can always be translated into a transformation of the distribution of the so-called price kernel e . In this paper, we will examine two well-known families of shifts in distribution. We first examine first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) shifts.
FSD shifts of the pricing kernel and the marginal utility of wealth
We say that price kernel b is FSD-dominated by pricing kernel e a if Ef ( e e b ) is smaller than Ef (e a ) for all non-decreasing real-valued function f. It implies that the distribution of e b can be obtained from the distribution of a by a e sequence of leftward shifts of probability masses. It is well-known that an FSD-dominated shift in the distribution of state prices unambiguously raises the expected utility of the investor.
5 An FSD-dominated shift in the price kernel is good news to the investor. In this section, we are interested in determining the e ect of such a shift in distribution on the marginal value of wealth. The following result is due to Gollier (2001b, Proposition 95) . It relies on the index of relative risk aversion R which is defined as R(c) = cu 00 (c)/u 0 (c).
Proposition 1
The marginal value of wealth under pricing kernel e b is smaller (resp. larger) than under pricing kernel e a whenever e b is FSDdominated by e a if and only if relative risk aversion is uniformly larger (resp. smaller) than unity: R(c) ( )1 for all c in the domain of u.
Proof: See Appendix A. Proposition 1 implies that an FSD-dominated shift in the distribution of state-prices reduces the optimal saving if and only if relative risk aversion is larger than unity. Here is our intuition about Proposition 1: a FSDdominated shift in the state-price density has a substitution e ect and a wealth e ect. The substitution e ect results from the increased e ciency of wealth due to the reduction in state prices, i.e., to the increase in the rate of return on savings. It raises the marginal value of wealth. But the FSD-dominated shift in the state-price density also increases consumption in all states. Because the marginal utility on consumption is decreasing (u 00 < 0), it tends to reduce the marginal value of wealth. The wealth e ect is increasing with the speed at which u 0 is decreasing, i.e., it is increasing in the degree of relative risk aversion. Thus, if we want the wealth e ect to dominate the substitution e ect, we need to put a lower boundary on relative risk aversion in order to guarantee that an FSD-dominated shift in the state price density reduces the marginal value of wealth. These two e ects can easily be identified in the degenerate case where e takes a specific value with probability 1. In this case,
The first term under brackets in the right-hand side of the equation measures the wealth e ect, whereas the second measures the substitution e ect. If relative risk aversion is larger than unity, the wealth e ect dominates the substitution e ect, and a sure reduction in the price of final consumption reduces the marginal value of wealth z. Proposition 1 extends this result to the case of uncertainty for all FSD-dominated shifts in the distribution of the pricing kernel.
MPS shifts of the pricing kernel and the marginal value of wealth
We now examine the e ect of a mean-preserving spread of the pricing kernel on the marginal value of wealth. Let us assume that e b is a mean-preserving spread of e a , i.e., that e b is obtained from e a by adding a white noise to it, as defined by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) . Because it is well-known in the theory of the consumer that the indirect utility function is convex in the vector of prices, observe that any MPS shift in the distribution of the pricing kernel raises the value of wealth. The intuition is that investors can always hedge these white noises at an actuarially fair price. Thus, adding these noises enlarges the risk-taking opportunity set. In other words, a mean-preserving spread in the price kernel is good news for the investor.
The following result determines the necessary and su cient condition for any such MPS shift to reduce the marginal value of wealth. It relies on the index of absolute risk aversion A defined as A(c) = u 00 (c)/u 0 (c) and on the index of absolute prudence P defined as P (c) = u 000 (c)/u 00 (c), a concept introduced by Kimball (1990) .
Proposition 2 The marginal value of wealth under pricing kernel e b is smaller (resp. larger) than under pricing kernel e a whenever e b is a meanpreserving spread of e a if and only if the ratio of absolute prudence to absolute risk aversion is uniformly smaller (resp. larger) than 2: 2A(c) ( )P (c) for all c in the domain of u.
Proof: See Appendix B. The intuition for this result is quite clear. A mean-preserving spread of the pricing kernel has two contradictory e ects on the marginal value of wealth. First, the greater variability in state prices means that there are more substitution possibilities so that consumption can be shifted to cheap states. This raises the expected level of consumption. This wealth e ect of an MPS shift in e reduces the marginal value of wealth. The size of this wealth e ect is approximately proportional to the elasticity of marginal utility to changes in consumption, which is given by A. But there is a second e ect because taking advantage of these substitution possibilities ex post implies more risk ex ante. This increased risk generates a precautionary saving e ect. Since Leland (1968) and Drèze and Modigliani (1972) , it is well-known that this increased future risk raises the marginal value of wealth if the consumer is prudent. This positive e ect is approximately proportional to P , as shown by Kimball (1990) . The global e ect of these increased opportunities to take risk on the marginal value of wealth is negative only if the wealth e ect is larger than the precautionary e ect, i.e., if 2A is larger than P . We see that the mechanisms acting in the case of an MPS shift of e are quite di erent from those of a FSD shift.
What can we say about whether 2A be larger or smaller than P ? This is a di cult question, because of the absence of any convincing estimation of absolute prudence. However, the following result is helpful in solving this problem.
Proposition 3 Suppose that absolute risk aversion tends to infinity when consumption tends to zero. Then we have the following two results:
Proof: A(0) = + is equivalent to T (0) = 0, where T = 1/A is the degree of absolute risk tolerance. Observe that T 0 (c) = 1 + (P (c)/A(c)). Thus, 2A(c) > P (c) is equivalent to T 0 (c) < 1. Combining this with T (0) = 0 implies that T (c) < c, or that relative risk aversion is larger than unity.¥ Of course, the opposite results are not true. In particular, if relative risk aversion is uniformly larger than unity, it does not imply that absolute prudence is uniformly less than twice the degree of absolute risk aversion. In the special case of constant relative risk aversion however, 2A > P is equivalent to R > 1. It is widely believed that relative risk aversion is larger than unity. Thus, in this special case, FSD-shifts and mean-preserving spreads of state prices have the same qualitative e ect on the marginal value of wealth, in spite of the important di erences of the underlying mechanisms leading to these results.
Dynamic portfolio strategies with predictability
We consider the simplest model to deal with this question. There are two periods indexed t = 0, 1. Consumption takes place only at the end of the second period (investment problem). In each period, there is a complete set of markets contingent on the state of the world that will be revealed at the end of the period. e t is the price kernel in period t. The investment opportunity set available to the investor at the beginning of the second period is fully characterized by the price kernel e 1 . The predictability hypothesis means that the distribution of e 1 depends upon the realization of e 0 . We solve the dynamic problem by backward induction. In the second period, given the realization ( 0 , m) observed at the end of the first period, the investor selects his portfolio that maximizes the expected utility of his final consumption:
where z is the accumulated wealth at the beginning of the second period, and v(z; 0 ) is the maximum expected utility that one can obtain with wealth z, given information contained in 0 . In the previous section, we examined the impact of a change in the conditional distribution of e 1 on the marginal value of wealth v 0 (z; 0 ) = v(z; 0 )/ z. At the beginning of the first period, the investor selects the portfolio c 0 (.) which maximizes the expected value of wealth at the end of the period:
where w 0 is the initial wealth of the investor. Notice that c 0 ( ) is not a level of consumption, but rather the wealth accumulated at the end of the first period in all states of nature whose state price is . When considering the first period alone, all risk-averse agents rank states of nature in the same way, prefering cheaper states to more expensive ones. This is because c 0 is decreasing in under risk aversion. Similarly, the opportunity set characterized by e b is said to be better than the one characterized by a if all risk-averse agents obtain a larger maximum expected utility under e b than under e a . The statistical dependency of the future opportunity set e and the short-term outcome of financial markets a ects the optimal structure of portfolios. We need some structure to this statistical relationship in order to signal this e ect. This is done with the following two definitions.
Definition 1 There is positive (negative) predictability when better news for the first period is better (worse) news for the future opportunity set.
Good news for the first period is equivalent to the realization of a cheaper state ( 0 low), since it implies a better first-period return. Under positive predictability, this implies that the opportunity set for the second period is improved. The intuition suggests that the hedging demand for risky assets should be negative because of the increased long term risk that this positive correlation generates. Positive predictability should have a negative e ect on the risk factor of the first period portfolio.
As observed in the previous section, there are two ways to improve the opportunity set in period 1. The first is to deteriorate the distribution of e 1 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (FSD). This would imply that all contingent plans become less costly. The second is to increase the riskiness of the distribution of e 1 in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz. This means introducing mean-preserving spreads (MPS), or zero-mean noises, to e 1 . Because investors can always hedge these noises at an actuarially fair price, adding these noises enlarges the risk-taking opportunity set.
Definition 2 There is FSD predictability if the conditional distributions of e 1 can be ordered according to the first-order stochastic dominance order. There is MPS predictability if the conditional distributions of e 1 can be ordered according to the Rothschild-Stiglitz increase in risk order.
The first period portfolio problem
By backward induction, it is observed that the e ect of predictability on the first period decision problem (5) is to make the value function v dependent on the first period state characterized by 0 . We assume that the marginal value of wealth v 0 is di erentiable with respect to the state 0 . In this section, we examine the solution of the portfolio problem (5). In particular, we want to determine the e ect of the state-dependency of the value function v on the optimal riskiness of the portfolio. In this static framework with complete markets, the measurement of the riskiness of the portfolio is not a simple matter. The variance of the portfolio return is relevant only for mean-variance investors, and e cient portfolios cannot be compared by using Rothschild-Stiglitz's concept of riskiness. We measure the degree of risk of a portfolio by the sensitiveness of the demand for Arrow-Debreu securities with respect to the state price. In a small neighborhood of , the local riskiness of portfolio c(.) is given by
When the sensitivity is zero for all , the portfolio is risk-free. When the sensitivity is uniformly increased, the variability of the portfolio return is increased and the portfolio is riskier. We want to determine the impact of the state-dependency of the value function on the riskiness of the optimal portfolio. The first-order condition of program (5) is written as follows:
for all 0 . Assuming that v 0 is di erentiable with respect to the state 0 , fully di erentiating this first-order condition yields
with
where c 0 is evaluated at 0 , and R 0 (c; ) = cv 00 (c; )/v 0 (c; ) is the degree of relative risk aversion of the value function. In the special case of a stateindependent value function that exhibits constant relative risk aversion , P is uniformly zero and the degree of riskiness of the optimal portfolio is inversely proportional to . Thus, a less risk-averse agent purchases a riskier portfolio. We see in equation (8) that the state-dependency of the value function has the e ect of adding a second term P to the degree of riskiness of the optimal portfolio. P (c 0 ; 0 ) describes the e ect of predictability.
To sum up, ( ) measures the local demand for risk of the optimal investor. It is the sum of two terms. The first term is the myopic demand which is inversely proportional to local relative risk aversion R 0 (c 0 ( ); ). It would be the demand for an investor who does not take into account the correlation of current returns with future returns. The second term in equation (8) corresponds to the hedging demand for risk, and is equal to P (c 0 ( ); ). Because v 00 is negative by risk aversion, the hedging demand for the short-term risk has a sign opposite to the cross-derivative of the value function. We thus obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 The hedging demand P for the short-term risk is uniformly positive (negative) if and only if the marginal value of wealth is uniformly decreasing (increasing) with the first period state price.
The intuition for this result is simple. In the unpredictable case, the marginal value of wealth is state-independent and the future wealth c 0 is decreasing with the realized price 0 . Risk-averse myopic agents accept to take risk because of the increased expected return that it generates. Let us consider the e ect of introducing some predictability in the model, in such a way that the marginal value of wealth would be decreasing with the price of the Arrow-Debreu security associated to the realized state. In such a situation, there would be a positive correlation between future wealth c 0 and the marginal value of that wealth v 0 . It implies that predictability yields an increase in the demand of Arrow-Debreu securities for which the demand was already large in the absence of predictability. Reciprocally, it reduces the demand for those states where the demand was low without predictability. Future wealth becomes more sensitive to the realized state, and the portfolio is riskier ex ante.
Another way to express this intuition is that, under the condition of Proposition 4, predictability yields a reduction in the marginal value of wealth where it is large without predictability (large 0 ), and it yields an increase in the marginal value of wealth where it is small without predictability (large 0 ). Therefore, predictability plays a role on the period-0 risk attitude that is equivalent to a reduction in the concavity of the utility function. Being in a sense less risk-averse, the rational investor would raise the riskiness of his portfolio.
In the remainder of this section, we combine this result with those obtained earlier in this paper.
The e ect of FSD predictability
We hereafter consider the case of positive FSD predictability. This means that we assume that a reduction in 0 (good news) generates an FSD-dominated shift in the distribution of e 1 (good news). Suppose that relative risk aversion of the utility function u is larger than unity. By Proposition 1, we know that an FSD-dominated shift in e 1 yields a reduction of the marginal value of wealth. Thus, positive FSD predictability implies in this case that the marginal value of wealth in the first period is increasing with the realized first period price 0 . According to Proposition 4, this yields the following result which fulfills one of the goals of the paper.
Proposition 5 Positive FSD predictability uniformly yields a negative (positive) hedging demand for the short-term risk if relative risk aversion is uniformly larger (smaller) than unity. These results are reversed in the case of negative FSD predictability.
When relative risk aversion equals unity, i.e., when the investor is logarithmic, FSD predictability yields no hedging asset demand. When relative risk aversion is larger than unity, the presence of a negative correlation in realized state prices (negative FSD predictability) induces agents with a long time horizon to take more risk in the first period. The intuition relies on the time diversification e ect of negatively correlated risks. However, when relative risk aversion is less than unity, the hedging demand for risk is negative in the first period. This is a case where investors want to be wealthier when markets perform badly in the first period, because of the expectation of a larger return on that wealth in the second period. Indeed, remember that the substitution e ect (which raises the marginal value of wealth) is larger than the wealth e ect (which reduces v 0 ) in this case.
The e ect of MPS predictability
In this section, we examine the e ect of positive MPS predictability. We assume that a reduction in 0 (good news) generates a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of e 1 (good news). Suppose that the utility function is such that prudence is absolutely smaller than twice the absolute risk aversion. Proposition 2, implies that a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of e 1 yields a reduction in the marginal value of wealth. Thus, the marginal value of wealth is increasing in 0 in this case. According to Proposition 4, this yields the following result which fulfills another of the goals of the paper.
Proposition 6 Positive MPS predictability uniformly yields a negative (positive) hedging demand for the short-term risk if the ratio of absolute prudence to absolute risk aversion is uniformly smaller (larger) than 2. These results are reversed in the case of negative MPS predictability.
These results parallel those obtained in Proposition 5 in the case of FSD predictability, except that the condition that R being uniformly larger than unity is replaced by the condition P/A being uniformly smaller than 2. These two conditions coincide only in the special case of constant relative risk aversion. To illustrate, consider the case of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) that has been examined for example by Merton (1971) . When absolute risk aversion is constant, the ratio of absolute risk aversion to absolute prudence is equal to unity, which implies that positive MPS predictability induces long term CARA investors to reduce optimal risk exposure in the first period. For the sake of comparison, notice that the e ect of FSD predictability is ambiguous in the CARA case, since relative risk aversion goes from zero to infinity when wealth increases. It cannot be uniformly larger than unity.
The overall message that could be extracted from the finance literature on predictability is that the sign of the e ect of predictability depends upon whether the investor is more or less risk-averse than the logarithmic investor. There is some fallacy in this claim. This statement is true only for positive MPS predictability when relative risk aversion is assumed to be constant, as usually assumed in this literature.
6 When relative risk aversion is not constant, the relevant condition is that the ratio of absolute prudence to absolute risk aversion be smaller than 2. The intuition for this condition is easy to understand. Under this condition, a large return in the first period reduces the low marginal value of wealth due to the mean-preserving spread in e 1 , because the precautionary e ect of the increased risk-taking is not large enough to compensate for the wealth e ect. The value function is therefore in a sense more concave in the first period, thereby inducing investors to reduce their optimal risk exposure. It is not possible to get this intuition when, limiting the analysis to power utility functions, we end up with the condition that "investors must be more risk-averse than log utility investors".
A typology of existing models of predictability
We have seen that the e ects of predictability are di erent in nature depending upon whether we consider FSD predictability or MPS predictability. In FSD predictability, there are a substitution e ect and a wealth e ect, and the global e ect can be signed if R is uniformly smaller or larger than unity. With MPS predictability, there are a wealth e ect and a precautionary e ect, and the global e ect can be signed if P/A is smaller or larger than unity. It is thus important to determine the nature of predictability under scrutiny. This is the goal of this section. There are two mainstream traditions of examining portfolio management. The first tradition, which we follow in this paper, relies on the assumption of complete markets. The one-risk-free-one-risky-asset model represents the alternative tradition. Since existing models of portfolio management with predictable returns rely on the second tradition, it is important to translate our results on the e ect of a shift in the distribution of state prices into results on the e ect of a shift in the distribution of asset returns. The complete markets tradition and the one-risk-free-one-risky-asset tradition are equivalent only when there are two states of nature, s = a and s = b, in each period. Thus, comparing our result to the existing literature forces us to examine this very special case. There is a risk-free asset whose gross return in period t is R f t . There is also a risky asset whose excess return in state s in period t equals x t (s). The probability of state s in period t is written as p t (s). Asset returns in the second period are predictable if R f 1 , x 1 (s) or p 1 (s) depends upon the realization of the first period state:
Assume without loss of generality that x t (a) 0 x t (b) and that Ee x t = p t (a)x t (a) + p t (b)x t (b) 0. Remember that b is the good state. Using the standard arbitrage method, we easily derive the price t (s) of state s in period t:
and
where s 0 is the realized state in period 0. It is important to observe that
This implies that any MPS of e 1 preserves the risk-free rate, whereas an FSD-dominated shift in e 1 raises the risk-free rate. Notice also that t (a) is larger than t (b), which means that state prices are inversely related to state returns. Hereafter we consider four di erent types of predictability that have been examined in the literature. All corollaries in the remainder of this section hold in the two-state case.
Bond portfolios
As is well-known, the no-arbitrage condition on bond markets implies some form of predictability of bond returns. More specifically, the expectation of an increase in the risk-free rate in the future reduces the value of long-term bonds, thereby reducing the current return of these bonds. This is formalized in our model by assuming that
The risky asset in the first period is the two-period bond whose return x 0 (s) is smaller in state a than in state b. Assuming that the state probabilities and the state return of the hypothetical risky asset in the second period are independent of the first period state, we obtain immediately from (10) and (11) that e 1 conditional on the expensive state 0 (a) in the first period is FSD-dominated by e 1 conditional on the cheap state 0 (b) in the first period. Thus, there is negative FSD predictability on the bonds market, and Proposition 5 yields the following result.
Corollary 1 There is negative FSD predictability when the short-term return of long-term bonds is negatively linked to the future risk-free rate. It implies that there is a positive (negative) hedging demand for long-term bonds if relative risk aversion is uniformly larger (smaller) than unity.
The optimal investment in the short and long bonds must take account of di erences in current expected returns and risk, but also of the recognition that long bonds have larger short-term returns when future short-term rates are expected to be lower. Thus, long bonds can hedge against changes in the future investment opportunity set. The hedging demand for long bonds is measured by the additional demand from a rational investor in comparison to what would demand a myopic investor treating the long bond as simply another risky asset. Brennan, Schwartz and Lagnado (1997) solve this problem by using a power utility function, together with assuming the pure expectations hypothesis. Campbell and Viceira (2001, 2002) estimate the negative serial correlation of long bond returns and calibrate a 1983-99 model combining short and long bonds together with equity and show that the hedging demand for long bonds has a large impact on the optimal structure of the portfolio of assets.
Mean-reversion in stock returns
In the remainder of this section, we assume that the risk-free rate R f is constant over time, so that long-term bonds are risk-free. Observe that this automatically implies that Ee 1 | s 0 = 1/R f is independent of s 0 . The information extracted from the first period state does not a ect the mean of e 1 . This excludes FSD predictability, but leaves open the possibility of MPS predictability.
In this paragraph, we assume in addition that state probabilities are certain (p 1 (s; a) = p 1 (s; b), s = a, b), and that there is some mean reversion in the return of the risky asset. More specifically, we assume that e x 1 | s 0 = b is a downward translation of x 1 | s 0 = a, i.e., that e
It implies from (11) that 1 (b; b) > 1 (b; a) and 1 (a; b) < 1 (a; a). When the state is good in the first period (s 0 = b), the distribution of e 1 is shifted in such a way that the cheaper state price ( 1 (b)) is increased and the expensive state price ( 1 (a)) is decreased. Because we know that the mean is preserved, e 1 undergoes a mean-preserving contraction, which is bad news. We conclude that mean reversion in stock returns is an example of negative MPS predictability. Using Proposition 6, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 2 There is negative MPS predictability when the return of the risky asset exhibits mean reversion. It implies that the hedging demand for the risky asset is positive (negative) if the ratio of absolute prudence to absolute risk aversion is uniformly smaller (larger) than 2.
Mean reversion in stock returns has been highlighted by Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1988) . Merton (1973) , Kim and Omberg (1996) and Campbell and Viceira (1999, 2002) consider a continuous-time model with one risky asset whose returns exhibit mean reversion, assuming constant relative risk aversion. They showed that this form of predictability induces investors to take more portfolio risk initially, if constant relative risk aversion is larger than unity. They report that for a constant relative risk aversion equaling 5, the hedging demand raises the total demand for stocks from 50% to 67% in the portfolio composition.
Our corollary shows that what really matters to determine the e ect of this form of predictability is not whether the investor has a large enough degree of risk aversion, but rather whether his degree of prudence is su ciently smaller than his degree of risk aversion. From this alternative point of view, we can have a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms that yield the result. Moreover, our result generalizes the already known property to a much larger set of utility functions and to other forms of predictability.
Stochastic volatility
Suppose alternatively that the expected excess return of the risky asset in the future is constant, but that its volatility is stochastic. Suppose in particular that a drop in stock returns in the first period yields an increase in volatility of stocks returns in the second period. This is done by assuming that, for some k > 0,
It implies that the expectation of e x 1 is independent of s 0 , and that e x 1 conditional on the good state s 0 = b is a mean-preserving contraction of e x 1 conditional on the bad state s 0 = a. Using (11), we easily verify that first period raises the large price 1 (a), and reduces the low price 1 (b). Thus, a mean-preserving contraction in returns yields a mean-preserving spread in state prices. We conclude that this form of stochastic volatility is an example of positive MPS predictability.
Corollary 3 There is positive MPS predictability when the volatility of stock returns is decreasing in past stock returns. It implies that the hedging demand for stocks is negative (positive) if the ratio of absolute prudence to absolute risk aversion is uniformly smaller (larger) than 2.
Chacko and Viceira (2000) report a negative correlation between stock returns and shocks to volatility, using US financial data over the period 1871-1997. They examine its e ect on the optimal portfolio strategy in a continuous-time model with constant relative risk aversion. The precautionary e ect of this form of predictability is exhibited when constant relative risk aversion is larger than unity. The e ect of time-varying volatility on the demand for stocks is sizeable. Chacko and Viceira (2000) report a reduction of the mean demand for stocks with respect to the myopic demand by 9.7 % when relative risk aversion equals 4.
Learning
Suppose now that the return in state a and b are known constant x(a) < 0 and x(b) > 0 over time, but the probabilities of these states is ambiguous. A Subjective-Expected-Utility investor will use probabilities p 0 (a) and p 0 (b) in the first period, and he will use Bayes rule to update these probabilities in the second period. Observing the good state s 0 = b in the first period raises the probability of the good state in the second period:
This implies that 1 (a; b) > 1 (a; a) and that 1 (b; b) < 1 (b; a). Thus, this learning e ect has the same qualitative e ect as stochastic volatility, yielding positive MPS predictability.
Corollary 4 There is positive MPS predictability when the investor uses Bayes rule to update his beliefs about the distribution of states. This implies that the hedging demand for the risky asset is negative (positive) if the ratio of absolute prudence to absolute risk aversion is uniformly smaller (larger) than 2.
Positive MPS predictability comes from a learning process in dynamic portfolio decisions, as studied by Gennotte (1986) , Brennan (1998) , Brennan and Xia (2001) , Barberis (2000) and Xia (2001) . Once again, these authors consider a continuous-time model with constant relative risk aversion. Gennotte (1986) for example shows that the ambiguity on the distribution of states should induce the investor to reduce his risk exposure early in the learning process when constant relative risk aversion is larger than unity. Kandel and Stambaugh (1996) , Barberis (2000) and Xia (2001) combine di erent forms of MPS predictability by looking at models where there is mean-reversion in stock returns, but with some estimated risk on the parameters of the mean-reversion. Barberis (2000) shows that the positive MPS predictability due to the learning process may dominate the negative MPS predictability due to the mean reversion. In that case, the overall MPS predictability reduces the initial demand for stocks when constant relative risk aversion is larger than unity.
It is interesting to observe that three families of predictability models -which seem a priori very di erent -yield exactly the same qualitative statistical structure on Arrow-Debreu prices. Positive MPS predictability is obtained in any of the following three phenomena:
• a positive correlation between current stock returns and future stock returns;
• a negative correlation between current stock returns and the future volatility of stock returns;
• a Bayesian learning process on the distribution of stock returns.
In these three cases, a better state in the first period yields a meanpreserving spread in state prices. By Proposition 6, they all yield the same qualitative e ect on the hedging demand for risk.
Exogenous predictability and incomplete markets
Up to now, we assumed that the future opportunity set is perfectly correlated with the first-period return. In this section, we take the extreme view that the source of predictability is exogenous to financial markets, i.e., that past returns convey no information on the future investment opportunity set.
But investors obtain exogenous information about it over time. For example, the exogenous information about future returns could be the outcome of an election, the occurrence of a technical innovation, or some signal contained in recent dividends.
7 Signal e m summarizes this information. How does the existence of such uncertainty about the distribution of future returns a ect the optimal portfolio prior to the observation of the information? Because e m and e 0 are not statistically related, there is no way to hedge the risk of change of the opportunity set. Markets are thus incomplete. It is thus a priori unclear how exogenous predictability should a ect the first period portfolio.
We solve this problem by backward induction. At date t = 1, the investor observes signal m. He then solves his second period portfolio problem:
The maximum expected utility that one can extract in turn from z prior to signal e m is thus equal to V (z), which is given by
At the beginning of the first period, the investor selects the portfolio c 0 (.) which maximizes EV (c 0 (e 0 )) subject to the budget constraint E [e 0 c 0 (e 0 ))] = w 0 . We compare the optimal first period portfolio risk to the one that would be optimal in an unpredictable economy where the distribution of e 1 is signal independent and is equal to the unconditional distribution of e 1 of the predictable world.
7 Fama and French (1988) showed that the dividend yield on common stocks is a good predictor of stock returns. Several recent papers examine the e ect of this kind of predictability on the optimal dynamic portfolio management. See for example Campbell (1996), Brenan, Schwartz and Lagnado (1997) and Barberis (2000) .
To solve this problem, we just have to examine how the concavity of the single-variable function V is a ected by this uncertainty. Fully di erentiating the first order condition u 0 (c( 1 , z; m)) = (z; m) 1 with respect to z yields
where T (c) = u 0 (c)/u 00 (c) is the degree of absolute risk tolerance. We know from the budget constraint that Ee 1 c z = 1, which implies that the degree of absolute risk tolerance of the value function equals
e Suppose first that u is CRRA, i.e., that T (c) = c/ . It yields
Notice that it is independent of m. Since V is a weighted sum of the same function v, we conclude that the absolute risk tolerance of the value function V is independent of the structure of future information. We conclude that the information structure has no e ect on the optimal portfolio ex ante in the CRRA case. The CRRA agent is myopic to exogenous predictability. The treatment of the more general HARA case is more tricky. When T (c) = + c/ , condition (14a) implies that
We see that we need to assume that signal e m does not a ect the risk free rate [Ee 1 ]
1 to obtain optimal myopia to exogenous predictability in the HARA case. The following Proposition refines the findings presented in Gollier (2001b) .
Proposition 7 CRRA investors are myopic to exogenous predictability. HARA investors are myopic to exogenous predictability which does not a ect the risk free rate.
It is noteworthy that several authors such as Campbell (1996) and Barberis (2000) derived optimal portfolio strategies for CRRA investors when future returns are predictable by using the dividend yield as a predictor. The above Proposition claims that information contained in future dividends has no e ect on the portfolio strategy of these investors. However, because the dividend yield is correlated with realized returns, using the dividend yield as a predictor combines exogenous predictability with a negative MPS predictability. Only this second form of predictability matters for CRRA investors to determine the hedging demand.
8 The existence of the potential innovation contained in the dividend yield that is not in realized returns has no impact on the hedging demand.
In the remainder of this section, we explore exogenous predictability when preferences are not HARA. We claim that convex (concave) absolute risk tolerance is necessary for exogenous predictability to raise (reduce) the optimal exposure to risk ex ante. To show this, we consider the special case where the unconditional distribution is degenerated to a single value which is normalized to unity. This is equivalent to saying that the unconditional expected excess return of stocks is zero. It implies that in the unpredictable world, investors do not take any risk in the second period, and V u (z) = u(z). In the predictable world, the distribution of e 1 will generally not be degenerated ex post. Assuming the convexity of absolute risk tolerance on consumption, Jensen inequality yields
Consider the case of an exogenous predictability which preserves the risk free rate: E [e 1 | m] = 1 for all m. It implies that
This is true for all m. Because V is a weighted average of functions v(.; m) where the degree of absolute risk tolerance is larger than T, the absolute risk tolerance must be larger than T, the degree of absolute risk tolerance of the value function in the unpredictable world. It implies that this predictability raises the initial portfolio risk.
8 When the level of the exogenous signal follows an autoregressive process e m t+1 = a + b e m t + e t , the level of the signal at t = 0 may a ect the optimal initial portfolio. But it is not di erent from what a myopic agent would do.
Proposition 8 Consider the case of exogenous predictability which preserves the risk free rate. Suppose also that the unconditional expected excess return of stocks is zero. This exogenous predictability raises (resp. reduces) the initial optimal portfolio risk if the absolute risk tolerance on final consumption is convex (resp. concave).
Treich (1997) obtained a similar result in the special case of small standard portfolio risks. Gollier (2001a) and Guiso and Paiella (2000) provide arguments for and against the convexity of absolute risk tolerance with respect to the level of consumption. The intuition for the above result is as follows: because in the unpredictable world, the investor does not take any portfolio risk in the second period, introducing predictability in this model is equivalent to enlarging his time horizon of risky investment. Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002) showed that doing so makes an agent more risk prone if and only if their absolute risk tolerance is convex.
Conclusion
How does the opportunity to take risk in the future a ect the willingness to take risk today? This question is particularly di cult when there is time variation in the distribution of assets returns. All papers addressing this question since the seminal work by Merton (1973) focussed on the special case of power, logarithm and exponential utility functions. By relaxing this constraint, we have been able to provide additional insights to the solution of this problem. We have shown that the kind of optimal dynamic risk management depends upon whether the predictability of future returns is of the first stochastic order or of the second stochastic order. In the case of FSD predictability, we only need to know whether relative risk aversion is uniformly smaller or uniformly larger than unity to determine the sign of the hedging demand for risk. But if we have MPS predictability, we need to compare the intensity of absolute prudence to absolute risk aversion to get an equivalent comparative statics property. It is only by chance that the two conditions are equivalent in the standard case of constant relative risk aversion. They di er in all other cases, as preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. More importantly, our analysis allows us to provide simple intuitions for the comparative statics of the various forms of predictability. Proof of su ciency. The value of = v 0 (z) can be obtained by combining the first-order condition (2) and the budget constraint. This yields
where function is defined as (y) = u 0 1 (1/y). Under risk aversion, this function is increasing in its argument. Define ( , ) = (1/ ). We have that is decreasing in and
Now, observe that relative risk aversion larger than unity is equivalent to the right-hand side of the above equation to be non-negative. Indeed, because u 0 ( (y)) = y 1 , 0 (y) = u 02 ( (y))/u 00 ( (y)), we have that 
with y = 1/ . T ( ) = u 0 ( )/u 00 ( ) is the degree of absolute risk tolerance evaluated at wealth . Thus is increasing in if and only if relative risk aversion is larger than unity.
Suppose that b is dominated by e a in the sense of first-order stochastic e dominance. We have to show that b a if R 1. Suppose by contradiction that b be larger than a . If relative risk aversion is larger than unity, we would have a contradiction, since condition (15) yields
< E ( a , e b ) E ( a , e a ) = z.
The first inequality comes from the assumption that b > a , whereas the second inequality comes from the definition of first-order stochastic dominance together with the property that is increasing in if R 1. This proves that R 1 is su cient for the result. Proof of necessity. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a c 0 such that R(c 0 ) be smaller than unity. By continuity, there is a neighborhood N of c 0 such that R(c) < 1 for all c in N. Consider the degenerate case where e takes value with probability 1. It implies that v(z) = u(z/ ) and
Consider now any z and such that z/ = c 0 . Consider also a sure reduction in , which is a special case of an FSD-dominated shift in distribution. We assume that the new remains in N. The above equation implies that v 0 (z) is increased by such FSD-dominated shift in distribution of the price kernel. This is a contradiction.¥ 
Now, observe that from 0 (y) = u 02 ( (y))/u 00 ( (y)), we have that 00 (y) = 0 (y)
Thus, and are concave in when 2A P. Suppose now that e b is a mean-preserving spread of e a , which means that Ef(e b )
Ef( a ) for all e concave real-valued function f. We have to show that b a . Suppose by contradiction that b be larger than a . If 2A P , we have a contradiction, since
The first inequality comes from the assumption that b > a , whereas the second inequality comes from the definition of a mean-preserving spread together with the property that is concave in if 2A P . This proves su ciency.
Proof of necessity. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a c 0 such that P (c 0 ) be larger than 2A(c 0 ). By continuity, there is a neighborhood N of c 0 such that P (c) > 2A(c) for all c in N. This means that is locally convex in around ( , ) = (u 0 (c 0 ), 1).Consider an initial price kernel e a that almost certainly takes value 1. Consider an alternative kernel e b which is a small mean-preserving spread of e a where support is contained in the interval of state prices where is convex. It implies that E ( b , e b ) is larger than E ( b , e a ). Because it must be that z = E ( b , e b ) = E ( a , e a ), and because is decreasing in , we conclude that b must be larger than a . This is a contradiction.¥
